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NOTE
SHOTS FIRED: DIGGING THEUNIFORMED SERVICES
EMPLOYMENT ANDREEMPLOYMENTRIGHTSACT OUT OF
THETRENCHES OFARBITRATION
Lisa Limb*
The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
(USERRA) was enacted to protect servicemembers from discrimination by ci-
vilian employers and to provide servicemembers with reemployment rights .
Recent circuit court decisions, however, have maimed these protections by
ruling that mandatory arbitration is permissible under USERRA . This Note
argues that such rulings conflict with USERRA’s plain language, statutory
structure, and purpose . Ultimately, in light of strong public policy considera-
tions, this Note contends that mandatory arbitration should not be permissi-
ble under USERRA and proposes that Congress amend the Act to explicitly
prohibit arbitration .
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INTRODUCTION
Kevin Ziober recalls texting his family, “What a great sendoff!” after he
was presented with cards, balloons, and a gift from his coworkers.1 Kevin, a
lieutenant in the U.S. Navy Reserve, worked as an operations director for
BLB Resources (BLB), a real estate firm in California.2 He was deploying to
Afghanistan for a year, so his supervisor and colleagues at BLB threw him a
farewell party.3 But only a few hours after Kevin “dug into a cake decorated
with an American flag and the words, ‘Best Wishes Kevin’ in red, white and
blue,”4 he was informed that he was being fired from BLB.5
Kevin had served in the Reserves since 2008.6 In October 2012, he was
called to active duty for a deployment to Afghanistan.7 To give as much ad-
vance notice as possible, Kevin notified both his supervisor and human re-
sources director at BLB that he was scheduled to deploy before even receiv-
ing his official orders;8 the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) required advance notice for Kevin to
be guaranteed reemployment by BLB after his deployment.9 According to
BLB, Kevin was fired because BLB did not know how long its federal gov-
1. Margot Roosevelt, Navy Reservist Wants a Day in Court, Not Arbitration, ORANGE
COUNTY REG. (June 6, 2016, 9:25 AM), http://www.ocregister.com/2016/06/06/navy-reservist-
wants-a-day-in-court-not-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/BEH2-2VV8].
2. Ziober v. BLB Res., Inc., No. SACV 14–00675–CJC(DFMx), 2014 WL 12700980, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2014), aff’d, 839 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 2016).
3. Roosevelt, supra note 1.
4 . Id .
5. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, Ziober v. BLB Res., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2274 (2017)
(mem.) (No. 16-1269) [hereinafter Ziober Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
6. Complaint para. 15, Ziober, 2014 WL 12700980 (No. 8:14-cv-00675) [hereinafter
Ziober Complaint].
7 . Id . para. 28; see also Brief of Members of Cong. as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner at 2, Ziober, 137 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 16-1269), 2017 WL 2376427 [hereinafter Amicus Brief
of Congress in Support of Ziober].
8. Ziober Complaint, supra note 6, para. 28.
9. Ziober Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 4.
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ernment contract would continue.10 And yet, he was the only employee fired
for this reason.11 Now, along with shouldering the responsibilities and stress
that accompany a deployment, Kevin had to worry about his employment
prospects.
USERRA was designed to shield servicemembers from situations like
Kevin’s and alleviate concerns about their reemployment.12 But when Kevin
sought to enforce USERRA against BLB, the United States District Court for
the Central District of California granted BLB’s motion to compel arbitra-
tion.13 Kevin had to sign an arbitration agreement to keep his job.14 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and held that he had to
arbitrate his USERRA claims because Congress did not explicitly manifest its
intent in USERRA to prohibit mandatory arbitration.15 The outcome of Kev-
in’s arbitrated case is unknown, since many arbitration decisions are not
published due to their private nature and confidentiality provisions.16 But
because arbitration generally lacks procedural safeguards and because em-
ployers have a repeat-player advantage,17 Kevin was probably not successful
in his legitimate claim against BLB.
Unfortunately, this scenario is common for veterans returning home
from deployments.18 When servicemembers are forced to arbitrate,
USERRA’s antidiscrimination provisions do not provide them with mean-
ingful protection. Deprived of their day in court, the servicemembers may be
left without jobs and with little or no recourse against their employers—all
because they decided to serve their country. The problem is compounded for
military reservists who, unlike their active-duty counterparts, need to pursue
full-time civilian careers to supplement their part-time military income.19
And because reservists can be called to long-term active duty at any time,
their military status poses a hurdle in finding civilian employment: employ-
ers have few incentives to hire or rehire an employee who may be forced to
10 . See Ziober Complaint, supra note 6, para. 34.
11. Ziober Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 5.
12. 38 U.S.C. § 4301 (2012).
13. Ziober v. BLB Res., Inc., No. SACV 14–00675–CJC(DFMx), 2014 WL 12700980, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2014), aff’d, 839 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 2016).
14. Ziober Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 5.
15. Ziober v. BLB Res., Inc., 839 F.3d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 2016).
16 . See Notice No . 915 .002, Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Em-
ployment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment, U.S. EEOC (July 10, 1997)
[hereinafter EEOC, Notice No. 915.002], https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html
[https://perma.cc/YW5Z-VZNK].
17 . See id .
18 . See Alison St. John, National Guard Members Struggle to Keep Civilian Careers, NPR
(Apr. 22, 2015, 3:47 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/04/22/401025857/national-guard-
members-struggle-to-keep-civilian-careers (on file with theMichigan Law Review).
19 . See Army Reserve Salaries, U.S. ARMY, https://www.goarmy.com/reserve/benefits/
money.html [https://perma.cc/8PVN-9J2A] (listing pay for an entry-level enlisted reservist
with less than two years of service as $3,431.43 per year).
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leave at a moment’s notice.20 If reservists are fortunate enough to find em-
ployment, there is still a risk that their employers will terminate them if the
reservist is called to active duty.21
This Note argues that claims under USERRA should supersede manda-
tory arbitration clauses. Part I explains how USERRA’s history and statutory
construction show Congress’s intent to provide broad protections to ser-
vicemembers. Part II argues that the circuit courts have misinterpreted the
statute’s text, undermining Congress’s intent by subjecting USERRA claims
to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Part III contends
that the recent volley of circuit courts’ decisions against servicemembers will
have far-reaching public-policy implications that will negatively affect our
servicemembers and, ultimately, our national defense capabilities.
I. THE FAAUNDERMINESCONGRESS’S INTENT TO PROTECT
SERVICEMEMBERSTHROUGHUSERRA
Since 1940, Congress has continuously expanded and strengthened pro-
tections for servicemembers and veterans reentering the civilian workforce
after serving our nation.22 But recently, the Supreme Court has increasingly
favored arbitration,23 and circuit courts have followed this tendency to com-
pel arbitration under USERRA.24 Section I.A explains how USERRA’s histo-
ry and statutory construction reflect an intent to provide broad protections
for servicemembers and impose stringent standards on employers. Section
I.B provides a brief background of the FAA and argues that arbitration
agreements overwhelmingly favor employers—stripping employees of im-
portant legal protections.
20 . See Theodore F. Figinski, Research: Companies Are Less Likely to Hire Current Mili-
tary Reservists, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/research-companies-
are-less-likely-to-hire-current-military-reservists [https://perma.cc/BBM9-USQ3].
21 . See id . (describing how if an employer hires a replacement worker for the reservist,
the employer is faced with either retaining the returning reservist and the replacement or los-
ing the investment made in the replacement, especially for jobs involving specialized skills).
22. Amicus Brief of Congress in Support of Ziober, supra note 7, at 5.
23 . See Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES
(May 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-
defining-this-supreme-court.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (explaining how the
Roberts Court’s rulings have been “far friendlier to business than those of any court since at
least World War II”); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere,
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/
business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html (on file with the
Michigan Law Review) (discussing how before his appointment in the Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Roberts was a prominent corporate defense lawyer representing businesses in enforcing
arbitration agreements).
24 . See, e .g ., Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 561–62 (6th Cir. 2008).
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A. USERRA’s History and Statutory Construction
Although USERRA was signed into law in 1994, its history goes back to
the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (STSA),25 the first federal stat-
ute to provide servicemembers with reemployment rights.26 In the early
1970s, as conscription was coming to an end, the Department of Defense
adopted the “Total Force Policy,” which provided that reservists “will be the
initial and primary source of personnel to augment the active forces.”27 As
the military shifted to an all-volunteer force and “relied to an extraordinary
degree” on its reservists,28 Congress further extended the scope of employ-
ment protections by passing USERRA in 1994.29
Congress designed USERRA to accomplish three critical goals: (1) to en-
courage noncareer military service by “eliminating or minimizing the disad-
vantages to civilian careers and employment,” (2) to provide reemployment
rights in order “to minimize the disruption to the lives of” servicemembers,
and (3) to prohibit employment discrimination against servicemembers.30
Congress gave USERRA teeth by including both a “savings” clause and a
“nonwaiver” provision: § 4302(a) of the statute saves agreements and laws
that are “more beneficial” to servicemembers, while § 4302(b) is a nonwaiver
25. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.2 (2017).
26 . See Daniel J. Bugbee, Employers Beware: Violating USERRA Through Improper Pre-
Employment Inquiries, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 279, 281 (2008). Although the STSA only applied to
those drafted into military service, Congress passed the Service Extension Act in 1941, expand-
ing the STSA’s reemployment provisions to individuals who voluntarily left their jobs to enter
the service. See Service Extension Act of 1941, ch. 362, Pub. L. No. 77-213, § 7, 55 Stat. 626, 627
(repealed 1956). Congress modified and renamed the STSA as the Veterans’ Reemployment
Rights Act (VRRA) during the Vietnam War. Bugbee, supra, at 281–82. The VRRA allowed
servicemembers to request an unpaid leave of absence from their employers to go on active
duty and guaranteed their same position upon return. See 38 U.S.C. § 2024(d) (1988), repealed
by Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–
353, 108 Stat. 3159.
27 . Title III—Operation and Maint .: Hearing Before the Subcomm . on Readiness of the
H . Comm . on Armed Servs ., 101st Cong. 136 (1989) (Statement of Richard A. Davis, Director,
Army Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office) [hereinafter Role of the Reserves in the Total
Force Policy] (delivering a prepared statement describing the role of the reserves in the “Total
Force Policy”).
28. Sean M. Hardy, A Fighting Chance: The Proposed Servicemembers Access to Justice
Act & Its Potential Effects on Binding Arbitration Agreements, 10 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 329,
329–30 (2010).
29 . See 20 C.F.R. § 1002.2 (“In enacting USERRA, Congress emphasized USERRA’s
continuity with the VRRA and its intention to clarify and strengthen that law.”); Konrad S. Lee,
“When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again” Will He Be Welcome at Work?, 35 PEPP. L. REV.
247, 256–57 (2008) (explaining how VRRA protections depended upon whether the reservist
entered active duty status voluntarily and involuntarily, whereas USERRA disregarded such
distinctions).
30. 38 U.S.C. § 4301 (2012).
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provision that prevents agreements and laws from reducing, limiting, or
eliminating rights provided by the Act.31
When interpreting these provisions, courts have resolved ambiguities in
favor of the servicemember, as in Kane v . Town of Sandwich.32 Timothy
Kane served in the Air Force Reserve while employed by the Sandwich Police
Department as a police officer.33 He was repeatedly denied promotions due
to his military status.34 Kane sued Sandwich, asserting discrimination claims
under both USERRA and Massachusetts’s antidiscrimination statute.35
Sandwich claimed that the Act preempted Kane’s state law claims and that
Kane was required to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing his
federal USERRA claim.36 The district court disagreed. It held that state law
claims were preserved under USERRA’s savings clause37 but that state laws
requiring a servicemember to meet additional prerequisites before filing a
USERRA claim were superseded by the Act.38
As discussed in Kane, Congress intended USERRA to “establish[] a
floor, not a ceiling, for the employment and reemployment rights and bene-
fits of those it protects” by including both the savings clause and a robust
nonwaiver provision.39 The Senate Veteran Affairs Committee noted that the
nonwaiver provision was meant to have an expansive reach: § 4302(b) would
preempt any state law or contract that would limit USERRA rights or impose
any additional prerequisites on the exercise of the Act’s rights and benefits.40
The House Report also emphasized that the nonwaiver provision was meant
to “reaffirm” the preemption of any employer agreements that provide fewer
31 . Id . § 4302 (2012); see Bodine v. Cook’s Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th
Cir. 2016) (referring to § 4302(b) as the “non-waiver” provision); id . at 1330 (Martin, J., dis-
senting) (referring to § 4302(a) as the “savings” clause).
32. 123 F. Supp. 3d 147 (D. Mass. 2015). Kane had received the highest score possible on
the Massachusetts Civil Service Sergeant’s Exam out of all the potential candidates for promo-
tion, but the promotion panel selected another candidate with a lower score. Id . at 151–52.
Furthermore, when Kane was under military orders to report to a military base, the Chief of
Police charged Kane with insubordination and launched an internal investigation against him
when Kane refused to comply with the Chief’s order to report to the Department instead. Id . at
152–153.
33 . Id . at 151.
34 . See id . at 151, 153.
35 . Id . at 153.
36 . Id . at 160.
37 . Id . (discussing how under § 4302(a), USERRA did not preempt Kane’s state law
claims because “Congress [did not] intend[] it to be a veteran’s exclusive means to combat dis-
crimination based on military status”).
38 . Id . (“[A]s a matter of law, USERRA supersedes state laws that require a plaintiff to
meet additional prerequisites before filing a federal USERRA claim.”).
39. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.7 (2017) (emphasis added). The nonwaiver provision prohibits the
enforcement of “any” contract or state law “that reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner
any right or benefit provided” by USERRA. 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
40. S. REP. NO. 103-158, at 41 (1993).
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rights than USERRA.41 The House explained that “resort to mechanisms
such as . . . arbitration . . . is not required,” and that “any arbitration decision
shall not be binding as a matter of law.”42 Despite Congress’s clear intent, ex-
pressed in both the plain language of the statute and its legislative history,
some circuit courts have held that mandatory arbitration of USERRA claims
is permissible under the FAA.43
B. Congress’s Intent to Preclude Employment Contracts from the FAA and
How the FAA Hurts Public Policy by Disadvantaging Employees
The FAA was passed in 1925 because courts were generally hostile to ar-
bitration agreements and reluctant to enforce them.44 There was a “perceived
need by the business community to overturn the common-law rule that de-
nied specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate in contracts between
business entities.”45 Congress intended the FAA to have the relatively limited
effect of placing arbitration agreements “upon the same footing as other con-
tracts.”46 The FAA explicitly excludes jurisdiction over employment con-
tracts,47 but recent judicial interpretations have vitiated this language.48
The Supreme Court handed down a string of proarbitration decisions in
the 1980s, establishing that employment contracts should be interpreted as
mandating arbitration. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp . v . Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc ., the Court upheld the arbitration of statutory claims.49 It rea-
soned that by arbitrating a statutory claim, a party did not lose any of the
statute’s substantive rights; rather, the party merely agreed to resolve the case
41. H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, pt. 1, at 20 (1993), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449,
2453.
42 . Id .
43. Ziober v. BLB Res. Inc., 839 F.3d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases).
44 . See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Russell D. Feingold, Policy Essay, Mandatory Arbitration:
What Process Is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 285 (2002). The “old judicial hostility to arbi-
tration” was based on the “agency” theory (that either party could revoke the arbitrator’s au-
thority at will because arbitrators were dual agents of the parties) and the “ouster of jurisdic-
tion” theory (that a private agreement should not prevent a court from deciding a dispute
otherwise within its jurisdiction). David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Busi-
ness: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 33, 74 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d
Cir. 1942)).
45. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 39 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) .
46. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
47 . Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the FAA was intended to
“exclude arbitration agreements between employees and employers”).
48 . See, e .g ., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (limiting the FAA’s
employment exemption to transportation workers).
49. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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in an arbitral forum, rather than a judicial one.50 The Court reinforced this
principle in Gilmer v . Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp ., in which it held that a
plaintiff, who sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), was compelled to arbitrate under a previous agreement.51 The
Court justified its holding by emphasizing that there was no evidence of
Congress’s intent to “explicitly preclude arbitration” within the ADEA,52 just
as some circuit courts have done with USERRA.53
In recent years, the Supreme Court has continued to decide cases in fa-
vor of compelling arbitration. In Circuit City Stores, Inc . v . Adams, the Su-
preme Court held that the FAA extended to all employment contracts unless
explicitly exempted and that employers could require employees to arbitrate
employment-discrimination claims.54 Following Circuit City, “courts have
routinely enforced boilerplate, mandatory arbitration provisions in em-
ployment contracts, even where there is clear evidence that, due to the dis-
parity in bargaining power, the employee had no meaningful right to reject
binding arbitration.”55
Supporters of arbitration defend it on three main grounds: streamlined
procedures, cost-effectiveness, and confidentiality.56 Arbitration’s “ad-
vantages” are gained, however, at the expense of the procedural and substan-
tive safeguards that courts generally provide.57 This negatively affects em-
ployees. Although the burden of proof in an arbitration proceeding is the
same as in court, employees’ ability to produce evidence is significantly cur-
tailed due to a severely limited and rushed discovery process.58
The confidentiality of arbitration agreements is also concerning. Where-
as courts are subject to review by both appellate courts and Congress, bind-
ing arbitration is not subject to any such corrective measures.59 The private
50 . Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628 (holding that “if Congress intended the substantive pro-
tection afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial
forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history”).
51. 500 U.S. at 35 (majority opinion).
52 . Id . at 29.
53. Ziober v. BLB Res. Inc., 839 F.3d 814, 817 (2016) (collecting cases).
54. 532 U.S. 101, 119 (2001).
55. Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 803, 819 (2009). And unlike a decision to arbitrate after a dispute arises, “employee[s]
faced with a pre-dispute arbitration agreement [are] less likely to either appreciate the im-
portance of choice of forum or consult counsel.” TIMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT
LAW: PRIVATEORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 1003 (3d ed. 2015).
56 . See, e .g ., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforce-
ment of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L.
REV. 449, 454–56 (1996).
57 . Id . at 456–57; Feingold, supra note 44, at 289.
58 . See EEOC, Notice No. 915.002, supra note 16; Schwartz, supra note 44, at 61; Victo-
ria J. Craine, Note, The Mandatory Arbitration Clause: Forum Selection or Employee Coercion?,
8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 537, 549 (1999).
59. EEOC, Notice No. 915.002, supra note 16.
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nature of arbitration makes it difficult to evaluate whether discrimination
laws are being fairly enforced.60 This issue is compounded because arbitra-
tors do not have to apply the relevant law, and judicial review is only availa-
ble in limited circumstances.61 Confidentiality benefits employers at the ex-
pense of employees, and it limits public accountability of employers who
have violated the law, weakening the deterrent effect of antidiscrimination
statutes like USERRA.62 Sealing arbitration decisions also prevents the legis-
lature from assessing whether certain industries or the individual employers’
practices are in need of reform.63 Furthermore, the party imposing mandato-
ry arbitration—in most cases, the employer—usually hires the arbitrator, in-
centivizing arbitrators to favor repeat and wealthy players.64 Since the arbi-
trator’s authority is appointed and defined by private agreement, rather than
by public law, employers can dictate the terms of the agreement to their ad-
vantage.65
Arbitration’s detrimental effect on employees is exemplified by the “ar-
bitration-litigation outcome gap.”66 A 2015 study of federal-court employ-
ment-discrimination litigation found that employees had a 35.7% lower suc-
cess rate in arbitration than in federal court.67 Employees are similarly
disadvantaged with respect to damages awarded. Damages awarded in arbi-
tration, on average, amounted to only 16% of the damages awarded in feder-
al court and a mere 7% of the average damages awarded in state court.68
These gaps can also affect plaintiffs’ ability to obtain legal counsel. Attorneys
60 . Id .
61 . See Feingold, supra note 44, at 289; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In
Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-
justice-system.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). The parties may also contract into
appellate review within the arbitral setting, but they cannot contract into expanded federal
court review. See Robert N. Rapp & Alexander B. Reich, AAA Shakes Up ADR with New Rules
to Permit Appeals of Arbitration Awards, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 6, 2013),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1d466bd0-aeff-43e5-96b9-def338ff7baf
[https://perma.cc/ZL34-Q9D8].
62 . See EEOC, Notice No. 915.002, supra note 16.
63 . Id .
64 . See id .; KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST.,
THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC 22 (2015), https://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-
epidemic.pdf [https://perma.cc/45KZ-VPSR]. Employers can even specify in contracts with
their employees that all arbitration cases will be handled exclusively by one particular arbitra-
tion firm. See Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 61.
65. EEOC, Notice No. 915.002, supra note 16. And because these arbitral mechanisms
limit public accountability of arbitrators, there are few controls ensuring that arbitrators are
acting independently and in an unbiased manner. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF.,
GAO/GDD-92-74, SECURITIESARBITRATION 6 (1992); Craine, supra note 58, at 551.
66 . See STONE&COLVIN, supra note 64, at 19–20.
67 . Id . at 19.
68 . Id .
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accepted, on average, almost 16% of potential litigation cases, while they ac-
cepted only about 8% of potential claims subject to mandatory arbitration.69
Arbitration, therefore, cannot advance the same social purposes as litiga-
tion.70 Unfortunately, many employees are faced with the choice of either
submitting to mandatory arbitration or potentially foregoing employment
altogether.71 This can hardly be called a choice.72 In the face of unequal bar-
gaining power,73 employees are forced to relinquish “fundamental legal pro-
tections” when resolving employment-discrimination claims.74
II. CIRCUITCOURTSHAVEMISINTERPRETEDUSERRA
In 2006, a circuit court decided a USERRA claim involving a mandatory
arbitration agreement for the first time.75 In Garrett v . Circuit City Stores,
Inc ., the Fifth Circuit held that USERRA claims are subject to arbitration
under the FAA.76 Since Garrett, three other circuit courts have followed
suit.77 Section II.A discusses pre-Garrett federal district court decisions. Sec-
tion II.B explains the Garrett decision and its progeny. Section II.C contends
that Garrett and its progeny were incorrectly decided.
A. Pre-Garrett Federal District Court Decisions
Before the Fifth Circuit’s Garrett decision, some federal district courts
held that compulsory arbitration agreements were superseded by USERRA.78
In Lopez v . Dillard’s, Inc ., a district court in Kansas held that, although an
employee would not give up any of her substantive rights under USERRA by
69 . Id . at 22.
70 . See id . at 26–27. Contra Ziober v. BLB Res., Inc., 839 F.3d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27–28 (1991)).
71 . See, e .g ., Melina Delkic, How Forced Arbitration Agreements Cheat Women in the
Workplace, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 25, 2017, 3:59 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/how-forced-
arbitration-agreements-women-work-692702 [https://perma.cc/8U4C-QGS3] (describing how
a reporter was forced to arbitrate her sexual harassment claim because she had signed an arbi-
tration agreement, knowing that “refusing the arbitration agreement would have meant refus-
ing her job”).
72 . See Feingold, supra note 44, at 291.
73. Garrett v. Hooters–Toledo, 295 F. Supp. 2d 774, 782 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
74 . See Feingold, supra note 44, at 292.
75. Bradford J. Kelley, Practitioner’s Note, All Quiet on the Employment Front: Manda-
tory Arbitration Under the USERRA, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 367, 389 (2017).
76. 449 F.3d 672, 681 (5th Cir. 2006).
77 . See Ziober v. BLB Res., Inc., 839 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 2016); Bodine v. Cook’s Pest
Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2016); Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559
(6th Cir. 2008).
78 . See Breletic v. CACI, Inc.—Fed., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Lopez
v. Dillard’s, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1249 (D. Kan. 2005). And some federal district courts
have so held after Garrett. E .g ., Kitts v. Menards, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 2d 837, 844 (N.D. Ind.
2007) (holding that plaintiff failed to prove that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of
USERRA claims).
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arbitrating her claim, § 4302(b) of the Act prohibited the imposition of
mandatory arbitration on the employee.79 The plaintiff, Jacqueline Lopez,
served in the National Guard while employed by Dillard’s Corporation.80
During her employment, Lopez was called to active duty, and Dillard’s
promised to keep her job open for her.81 But when Lopez returned, Dillard’s
forced her to reapply for her old position and then did not rehire her.82
Lopez filed a USERRA claim, and Dillard’s filed a motion asking the court to
compel arbitration under an arbitration agreement Lopez agreed to when
Dillard’s initially her.83
Although the arbitration agreement in this case empowered the arbitra-
tor to grant the same remedies and apply the same substantive law as a fed-
eral court would, the district court nonetheless held that the agreement was
superseded by USERRA.84 Under the plain language of § 4302(b) of the stat-
ute, the provision superseded any contract or agreement that imposed addi-
tional prerequisites to the exercise of any USERRA benefit.85 The court ob-
served that Congress had not enumerated arbitration as a means to
effectuate the Act’s rights.86 Instead, Congress provided that a servicemem-
ber asserting a USERRA claim could seek assistance from the Secretary of
Labor and the Attorney General87 or bring an action in a federal district
court.88 And because the arbitration agreement required that the plaintiff
“seek relief in an arbitral forum,” the court found that arbitration agree-
ments posed an “additional prerequisite” to exercising USERRA rights.89
Similarly, in Breletic v . CACI, Inc .—Federal, a district court in Georgia
held that USERRA superseded an arbitration agreement because the statute
expressly granted the servicemember a right to pursue his claim in a judicial
forum.90 The plaintiff, John Breletic, was hired by CACI in 2000 and signed a
mandatory arbitration agreement as a prerequisite to his employment.91 In
2001, Breletic provided CACI with notification of his impending orders to
active duty.92 In 2003, when Breletic was released from active duty, CACI
told Breletic that it could not reemploy him because his position had been
79 . Lopez, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1248.
80 . Id . at 1245.
81 . Id .
82 . Id .
83 . Id . at 1246.
84 . Id . at 1248.
85 . Id .
86 . Id .
87 . Id .
88 . Id .
89 . Id .
90. 413 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1337–38 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
91 . Breletic, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 1331.
92 . Id . at 1332.
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eliminated—even though CACI was advertising for positions nearly identical
to the one Breletic had held in 2001.93
In assessing whether USERRA preempted the arbitration agreement, the
district court acknowledged that the Supreme Court had held that statutory
claims may be subject to arbitration under the FAA.94 Following the Su-
preme Court’s precedent in Gilmer, the court first looked at USERRA’s text
before turning to the statute’s legislative history.95 The court noted that the
plain language of § 4302(b) explicitly states that USERRA supersedes any
“agreement . . . that reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner any right or
benefit provided by” USERRA.96 Accordingly, the court held that the Act su-
perseded any arbitration agreements that diminish USERRA rights.97 Basing
its decision in part on the House Report on § 4302(b), the court found that
the congressional intent behind USERRA’s antiwaiver provision was to
“preempt employer-employee agreements that limit rights provided under
USERRA or put additional conditions on those rights.”98 Because CACI’s ar-
bitration agreement required Breletic to waive his USERRA right to bring his
claim in a judicial forum, the court held that the agreement was against the
public policy behind by the Act.99
B. Garrett and Its Progeny
Garrett was the first federal appellate decision to hold that mandatory
arbitration was permissible under USERRA.100 While employed by Circuit
City, Michael Garrett also served in the Marine Corps Reserves.101 A year af-
ter Garrett was hired, Circuit City adopted binding arbitration agreements
for its employees.102 Garrett and the other employees were given an opt-out
form, which gave an employee thirty days to exercise his opt-out right, and a
receipt form.103 Garrett acknowledged receipt of the form, but he did not
opt-out of the arbitration provision within the thirty-day timeline.104 Be-
tween December 2002 and March 2003, as the military began combat opera-
tions in Iraq, Garrett started receiving unjustified criticism and disciplinary
93 . Id .
94 . Id . at 1335 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)).
95 . Id .
96 . Id . at 1336 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2000)).
97 . Id . (citing Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1032 (11th Cir.
2003)).
98 . Id . at 1337.
99 . Id . at 1337–38.
100. Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 673 (5th Cir. 2006); Kelley, supra
note 75, at 389.
101. Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 717, 719 (N.D. Tex. 2004), rev’d,
449 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2006).
102 . Id .
103 . Id .
104 . Id .
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actions from his supervisors, ultimately resulting in his termination in
March 2003.105
Garrett sued under USERRA, claiming that his termination was due to
his status as a reservist.106 Circuit City responded by filing a motion to com-
pel arbitration, contending that Garrett’s failure to opt-out of the binding
arbitration provision waived his right to a judicial forum.107 As in Lopez and
Breletic, the district court determined that the antiwaiver provision of
§ 4302(b) invalidated binding arbitration contracts.108 The district court not-
ed, however, that there is “nothing in USERRA that precludes non-binding
arbitration prior to jury trial in federal court.”109 Circuit City appealed the
denial of its motion to compel arbitration.110
Relying on the FAA and the Supreme Court’s line of arbitration cases,
the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, finding that USERRA
claims could be subject to mandatory arbitration.111 Citing Gilmer112 and
Mitsubishi,113 the court applied a strict approach to USERRA’s text.114 It not-
ed that § 4302(b) does not explicitly mention the FAA or mandatory arbitra-
tion.115 The court reasoned that because Congress was on notice of the
Gilmer decision—which was issued three years before USERRA was enact-
ed—Congress’s failure to address arbitration in § 4302(b) was “not a clear
expression of Congressional intent concerning the arbitration of service-
members’ employment disputes.”116 Therefore, § 4302(b) defined substantive
rights, rather than procedural ones providing an exclusive judicial forum.117
The court buttressed this interpretation by finding that an arbitration
agreement is “effectively” a procedural forum selection clause, meaning that
USERRA’s substantive rights could still be enforced through arbitration.118
When Garrett pointed to § 4302’s legislative history, the court summari-
ly dismissed his argument, stating that this “snippet” of “scant” legislative
history had no precedential value and that it “hardly prove[d] Congress’s in-
105 . Id .
106 . Id .
107 . Id .
108 . Id . at 722.
109 . Id . (emphasis added).
110. Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 674 (5th Cir. 2006).
111 . Id . at 681.
112. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
113. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
114 . See Kelley, supra note 75, at 390.
115 . Garrett, 449 F.3d at 677.
116 . Id .
117 . Id . at 678.
118 . Id . In support of its reasoning, the court analogized USERRA to other discrimina-
tion statutes, such as the ADEA (employment protections for the elderly) and Title VII (em-
ployment protections against employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin), which the Supreme Court has held are subject to arbitration. Id . at 680–81.
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tention toward all cases involving arbitration.”119 Garrett also unsuccessfully
contended that arbitration inherently conflicts with USERRA: because
USERRA granted the Department of Labor and the Attorney General’s office
the authority to enforce claims, arbitration would conflict with this remedial
scheme.120 In rejecting Garrett’s argument, the court likened USERRA to
other employment-discrimination statutes, like Title VII and the ADEA, un-
der which an employee could still be subject to arbitration even though she
retained the right to file a private cause of action or have an agency pursue a
civil action.121
The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Garrett set a precedent that disadvantaged
servicemembers in other courts.122 The Sixth Circuit was next to address the
issue, in Landis v . Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC.123 Timothy Landis, an optometrist
serving in the National Guard, signed a binding arbitration agreement as
part of his employment contract with Pinnacle.124 When Landis returned
from his deployment, Pinnacle demoted him and threatened additional dis-
ciplinary actions if Landis continued serving in the military.125 Landis filed
suit in district court under USERRA, but the district court granted Pinnacle’s
motion to arbitrate.126 Landis appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed
the district court’s order to compel arbitration.127 Relying on the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s holding in Garrett, the Sixth Circuit concluded that USERRA’s text did
not indicate a congressional intent to preclude mandatory arbitration and
that there was no inherent conflict between arbitration and USERRA’s un-
derlying purposes.128 Like the Fifth Circuit, the court gave short shrift to
USERRA’s legislative history.129
But unlike the Garrett opinion, Landis included a concurrence. Alt-
hough he agreed with the majority’s judgement, Judge Guy Cole wrote sepa-
rately to “acknowledge the odd result this holding produces and to encour-
119 . Id . at 679.
120 . Id . at 680–81.
121 . Id . at 680–81. In EEOC v . Waffle House, Inc ., the Supreme Court held that under the
FAA, the presence of an enforceable arbitration agreement did not infringe on the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) authority nor limit any remedies available to the
EEOC if it decided to pursue a lawsuit on behalf of disabled victims of discrimination. 534 U.S.
279, 297–98 (2002). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that nothing in USERRA would pre-
clude the Attorney General from representing Garrett in arbitration. Garrett, 449 F.3d at 681.
122 . See, e .g ., Will v. Parsons Evergreene, LLC, No. 08–cv–00898–DME–CBS, 2008 WL
5330681, at *3–4 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 2008) (finding that the arbitration clause was not a prereq-
uisite, because it operated as a waiver of a judicial forum, and that there was no indication that
USERRA rights could not be fully realized in arbitration).
123. 537 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2008).
124 . Landis, 537 F.3d at 560.
125 . Id . at 561.
126 . Id .
127 . Id .
128 . Id . at 562–63.
129 . Id .
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age Congress, when this issue comes up again, to be a bit more clear.”130 In
parsing § 4302(b)’s language, Judge Cole noted that its latter clause, which
precludes “the establishment of additional prerequisites,” manifested Con-
gress’s intent to prohibit employers from requiring their employees to resort
to additional mechanisms—such as arbitration.131 He found that the legisla-
tive history further cemented Congress’s intent to include arbitration as an
“additional prerequisite[].”132 Thus, the majority’s interpretation produced
an incongruous result, since USERRA was intended to give employees—not
employers—the right to choose the forum in which to pursue their claims,
but mandatory arbitration requires the employee “to substitute federal court
with arbitration.”133 In closing his opinion, Judge Cole criticized Congress’s
poor drafting, stressing that if Congress had intended to preclude arbitration
as a replacement for a judicial forum, it should “do so with language that is
unmistakably clear.”134
The Eleventh Circuit also sided with Garrett in Bodine v . Cook’s Pest
Control Inc ., holding that USERRA’s antiwaiver provision does not conflict
with the FAA because both statutes “provide a mechanism for striking from
an arbitration agreement a term in conflict with USERRA.”135 The service-
member, Rodney Bodine, argued that the arbitration agreement in question
had two terms that directly violated USERRA: (1) the arbitration agreement
allowed the arbitrator to reapportion fees, including attorney’s fees, between
the parties; and (2) the agreement imposed a six-month statute of limita-
tions.136 Because USERRA explicitly proscribes a statute of limitations and
declares that costs or fees cannot be imposed on the plaintiff, Bodine chal-
lenged the validity of the entire arbitration agreement.137 In support of his
argument, Bodine contended that § 4302(b)’s use of the word “supersede”
was intended to automatically invalidate any contractual agreement that re-
duces, limits, or eliminates USERRA’s substantive rights.138 The court reject-
ed Bodine’s argument; instead, it interpreted “supersede” to mean “replacing
one thing with another, rather than causing something to be cancelled or in-
validated without replacement.”139 The court reasoned that construing
§ 4302(b) as replacing all of the terms that conflict with the Act while keep-
ing all of the terms that are more beneficial than USERRA would result in
the most favorable interpretation for servicemembers.140 In her dissent, how-
130 . Id . at 564 (Cole, J., concurring).
131 . Id . (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2006)).
132 . Id . (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2006)).
133 . Id .
134 . Id . at 565.
135. Bodine v. Cook’s Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2016).
136 . Id . at 1323.
137 . Id .
138 . Id . at 1326.
139 . Id . at 1327.
140 . Id .
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ever, Judge Beverly Martin pointed out that the majority’s holding would ac-
tually “weaken[] the rights of veterans based on a statute intended to give
them strength” because it would “foster employer overreaching.”141
The most recent circuit court decision came from the Ninth Circuit rul-
ing against Kevin Ziober.142 In Ziober v . BLB Resources, Inc ., the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that USERRA claims were subject to mandatory arbitration agree-
ments.143 Citing Garrett, Landis, and Bodine, the Ninth Circuit agreed that
neither the Act’s text nor its legislative history manifested a congressional
intent to preclude compelled arbitration of USERRA claims.144 The court
further justified its conclusion by maintaining that Kevin did not lose any
substantive protections by arbitrating his claims.145 Lastly, the court reasoned
that because Congress did not include a plain statement precluding arbitra-
tion, USERRA did not include “a non-waivable procedural right to a judicial
forum.”146
C. The Circuit Courts Are Reaching the Wrong Conclusion Due to an
Erroneous Reading of USERRA and an Unjustified Disregard for USERRA’s
Legislative History
The circuit courts are incorrect in holding that servicemembers must
submit to coercive arbitration agreements.147 Despite claiming a strict textu-
alist interpretation of § 4302(b), the circuit courts have instead twisted
USERRA’s plain language, gutting the Act of its protections and disregarding
Congress’s intent in passing USERRA. As the Breletic court noted, § 4302(b)
states in plain language that it supersedes any contracts that infringe on
USERRA rights, including those that pose an additional prerequisite to exer-
cising those rights.148 Arbitration agreements are contracts, but they pose
additional prerequisites by requiring servicemembers to arbitrate before pur-
suing their USERRA claim in a judicial forum.149 Therefore, the Act super-
sedes any mandatory arbitration agreement.150 Furthermore, the courts’ rea-
soning relies on the assumption that arbitration can provide a platform for
servicemembers to substantively vindicate their claims, but this Note argues
141 . Id . at 1328, 1333 (Martin, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
142. See supra Introduction for the discussion and factual background of Ziober.
143. 839 F.3d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 2016).
144 . Ziober, 839 F.3d at 817.
145 . Id . at 818.
146 . Id .
147 . See Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 564 (6th Cir. 2008) (Cole, J.,
concurring).
148. Breletic v. CACI, Inc.—Fed., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
149 . Id . at 1334, 1336.
150 . Id . at 1336. A servicemember could agree to arbitration if they so choose. See H.R.
REP. NO. 103-65, pt. 1, at 20 (1993), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 2453 (noting that a
USERRA plaintiff may waive rights if the waiver is “clear, convincing, specific, unequivocal,
and not under duress”).
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that arbitration is an inadequate replacement and not substantively compa-
rable.
In Bodine, the Eleventh Circuit strained to interpret the word “super-
sedes” to have as restrictive a definition as possible.151 The majority first cited
Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “supersede” as “[t]o annul, make void,
or repeal by taking the place of,” before turning to two other dictionaries.152
Rather than accepting the first definition, which supported Bodine’s argu-
ment, the majority found ambiguity despite this plain definition.153 As dis-
senter Judge Martin pointed out, § 4302(b)’s use of the word “supersede” is
not so ambiguous that courts should freely speculate about Congress’s in-
tent.154 She also noted that the majority’s reading of § 4302(b) would leave its
companion clause, § 4302(a), superfluous: if § 4302(b) only voids the illegal
parts of a contract, rather than invalidating the entire contract, then there
would never be any “more beneficial” provisions for § 4302(a) to save.155
Under Supreme Court precedent, courts must be “hesitant to adopt an inter-
pretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another
portion of that same law.”156
Even if the Eleventh Circuit majority’s definition of “supersedes” is ac-
cepted, USERRA does “replac[e] one thing with another”157: it replaces arbi-
tration with a judicial forum. As the Supreme Court noted in Mitsubishi,
“[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the sub-
stantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in
an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”158 By using the word “rather,” the
Supreme Court indicates that arbitration can replace a judicial forum, and by
that reasoning, an arbitral forum is replaceable by a judicial one.
Aside from the word “supersedes,” § 4302(b)’s latter clause, which pro-
hibits the establishment of additional prerequisites, 159 is another decree
against mandatory arbitration.160 In Ziober, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
151 . See Bodine v. Cook’s Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2016).
152 . Id . at 1326 (emphasis added) (quoting Supersede, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014)).
153 . See id . at 1326–27.
154 . Id . at 1330 (Martin, J., dissenting).
155 . Id . at 1330–31.
156. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988); see also
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 299 n.1 (2006) (“[I]t is gener-
ally presumed that statutes do not contain surplusage . . . .”); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,
174 (2001).
157 . Bodine, 830 F.3d at 1327.
158. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)
(emphasis added).
159. 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2012).
160 . See Lopez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1249 (D. Kan. 2005) (“If the refer-
ence to prerequisites is to be given some meaning apart from preserving plaintiff’s substantive
rights under the act (which it must in order to avoid rendering that language mere surplusage),
it must be construed as invalidating procedural changes not authorized by Congress.”).
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the Supreme Court’s decision in CompuCredit Corp . v . Greenwood161 stopped
Ziober from arguing that USERRA created “a non-waivable procedural right
to a judicial forum.”162 In CompuCredit, the Supreme Court had held that
because the applicable statute was silent on the topic of arbitration, the FAA
required courts to enforce signed arbitration agreements.163 The Ninth Cir-
cuit interpreted CompuCredit to mean that a statute forecloses arbitration
only if Congress uses the word “arbitration” in a statute’s nonwaiver provi-
sion.164 But the Supreme Court had merely observed in CompuCredit that
when Congress “restricted the use of arbitration in other contexts, it has
done so with a clarity that far exceeds the claimed indications in the [Credit
Repair Organizations Act].”165 Nowhere in CompuCredit did the Supreme
Court state that a statute could not “describe the process of arbitration with-
out using the word ‘arbitration.’ ”166 Congress did exactly that with § 4302(b).
As Judge Cole notes in his Landis concurrence, by “additional prerequisites,”
Congress meant to prohibit employers from requiring employees to resort to
additional mechanisms such as arbitration.167
Moreover, although the Garrett court relied on Congress’s failure to ex-
pressly refer to arbitration in USERRA after Gilmer, the court’s single-
minded focus on this is misplaced.168 Gilmer did not involve an employment
agreement; rather, it explicitly left open the question of the FAA’s applicabil-
ity to employment agreements.169 It was not until 2001, almost seven years
after USERRA was enacted, that the Supreme Court, in Circuit City Stores,
Inc . v . Adams, finally decided that the FAA covered employment con-
tracts.170
Aside from USERRA’s plain text, there are other indications of congres-
sional intent to preclude mandatory arbitration for the benefit of service-
members in the Act’s legislative history. For example, on the topic of
§ 4302(b)’s scope, the House Committee Report states that § 4302(b) would
161. 565 U.S. 95 (2012).
162. Ziober v. BLB Res., Inc., 839 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 2016).
163 . CompuCredit, 565 U.S. at 104.
164 . See Ziober, 839 F.3d at 819.
165 . CompuCredit, 565 U.S. at 103.
166. Plaintiff-Appellant’s Reply Brief at 14, Ziober, 839 F.3d 814 (No. 14-56374), 2015
WL 1396699.
167. Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 564 (6th Cir. 2008) (Cole, J., con-
curring) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, pt. 1, at 20 (1993), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2449, 2453); 70 Fed. Reg. 75,246, 75,257 (Dec. 19, 2005) (reading § 4302(b) as including “a
prohibition against the waiver in an arbitration agreement of an employee’s right to bring a
USERRA suit in Federal court.”); see also Ziober, 839 F.3d at 822 (Watford, J., concurring) (“If
USERRA confers the right to a judicial forum, then § 4302(b) arguably renders invalid any pre-
dispute waiver of that right through an agreement to submit USERRA claims to arbitration.”);
Lopez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248 (D. Kan. 2005).
168 . See KATHRYN PISCITELLI&EDWARD STILL, THEUSERRAMANUAL § 8:15 (2017).
169. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991).
170. PISCITELLI& STILL, supra note 168, § 8:15.
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reiterate that resorting to additional mechanisms, like arbitration, would not
be required: “It is the Committee’s intent that, even if a person protected un-
der the Act resorts to arbitration, any arbitration decision shall not be bind-
ing as a matter of law.”171 Rather than crediting this evidence of Congress’s
intent to preclude arbitration, the Ziober court concluded that Congress’s
concerns applied to collective-bargaining agreements instead of individual
agreements.172 Yet the Report does not distinguish between union and non-
union arbitration agreements—the Report states that “any arbitration deci-
sion shall not be binding.”173
Additionally, the “special solicitude” that Congress conferred on ser-
vicemembers also clashes with the circuit courts’ interpretations.174 Con-
gress’s “special solicitude” for veterans, in recognition of their important
service for the nation, has led Congress to “place a thumb on the scale in the
veteran’s favor” when enacting legislation concerning veterans.175 The Su-
preme Court’s decisions have consistently recognized and respected this un-
derstanding.176 The Court adopted a corollary principle by interpreting stat-
utes in a manner that liberally construes reemployment rights for the benefit
of servicemembers.177
The Ninth Circuit, however, misapplied this principle of liberal con-
struction by holding that arbitration agreements do not require a party to
forgo any substantive rights.178 But this is an erroneous assumption: the can-
on of liberal construction holds that all interpretations are to be construed in
favor of veterans,179 without qualifying whether the statutory provision is
substantive or procedural.180 USERRA’s legislative history belies any distinc-
171 . Ziober, 839 F.3d at 820 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, pt. 1, at 20 (1993), as reprint-
ed in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 2453).
172 . See id . at 821.
173. H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, pt. 1, at 20 (1993), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449,
2453 (emphasis added).
174. Amicus Brief of Congress in Support of Ziober, supra note 7, at 10.
175. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 440 (2011) (quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 556
U.S. 396, 416 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting)); see also Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair
Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 284 (1946) (stating that as an acknowledgement of a servicemember’s sac-
rifice, the servicemember was “to gain by his service for his country an advantage which the
law withheld from those who stayed behind”).
176 . See, e .g ., Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 412 (2009).
177 . Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 285. Under this principle, separate provisions of a statute are to
be treated as “parts of an organic whole and [courts are to] give each as liberal a construction
for the benefit of the veteran as a harmonious interplay of the separate provisions permits.” Id .
178. Ziober v. BLB Res., Inc., 839 F.3d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 2016).
179. Ala. Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 584 (1977) (“[W]e announced two principles
that have governed all subsequent interpretations of the re-employment rights of veterans.”
(emphasis added)).
180. Ziober Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 31–32.
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tion in applying this principle: in enacting the statute, Congress stated that
“the Act is to be ‘liberally construed.’ ”181
Ultimately, Congress’s “special solicitude” and the Supreme Court’s
canon of liberal construction for servicemembers embody a promise to those
who serve our country that their claims will be fairly and fully decided.182
Although the circuit courts insist that allowing compelled arbitration pro-
vides “the greatest benefit to our servicemen and women”183 and that arbitra-
tion furthers the same social purposes as litigation,184 these assumptions have
proven to be inaccurate. As discussed previously,185 mandatory arbitration
lacks procedural protections, preventing employees from effectively vindi-
cating their substantive rights.186 This is exacerbated when, under the current
circuit precedent, employers are free to insert boilerplate arbitration agree-
ments into every employment contract, so that courts will essentially be
stripped of their authority to enforce USERRA.187 Such an outcome is anti-
thetical to Congress’s intent in passing the statute, particularly when
USERRA expressly refers to the “right of a person . . . to commence an action
under § 4323.”188
III. A POSSIBLEREMEDY FOR BINDINGARBITRATION’S
THREAT TONATIONALDEFENSE
The trend of subordinating USERRA claims to mandatory arbitration
agreements is especially alarming because of its potential impact on national
security. Section III.A argues that stripping USERRA protections will have
an adverse impact on military recruitment and retention, which will ulti-
mately jeopardize our national defense capabilities. Section III.B identifies
and addresses possible counterarguments and concludes with possible solu-
tions to the USERRA and mandatory arbitration problem.
181. H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, pt. 1, at 19 (1993), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449,
2452 (emphasis added) (quoting Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 285); accord S. REP. NO. 103-158, at 40
(1993).
182. 146 CONG. REC. 16052–53 (2000) (statement of Rep. Evans); Amicus Brief of Con-
gress in Support of Ziober, supra note 7, at 10; see also 146 CONG. REC. 19229–30 (2000)
(statement of Sen. Rockefeller) (explaining that the systems designed to protect veterans
“should not create technicalities and bureaucratic hoops for them to jump through”).
183 . E .g ., Bodine v. Cook’s Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2016).
184 . E .g ., Ziober v. BLB Res., Inc., 839 F.3d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 2016).
185 . See supra Section I.B.
186 . But see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
(1985).
187 . See Bodine, 830 F.3d at 1322 (Martin, J., dissenting).
188. 38 U.S.C. § 4327(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
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A. Military Recruitment and Retention Are Negatively Affected
by Forced Arbitration of USERRA Claims
Because the U.S. military structure is still based on the “Total Force Poli-
cy,”189 it relies heavily on reservists.190 Currently, reservists constitute ap-
proximately 38% of the nation’s total military force and a majority of Army
forces.191 In addition to combat operations, the nation depends on reservists
to assist federal and state governments during a state of emergency,192 acting
as the frontline for responses to any major natural disaster.193
The military is having difficulty recruiting reservists.194 This is concern-
ing: reservists provide critical support to the common defense of the nation
every day.195 This problem has become even more pressing as the military
actively attempts to further expand its forces.196 If USERRA protections
erode, service in the Reserves will be less economically feasible for potential
recruits to the point that many individuals may choose to forgo service alto-
gether.197 Because “[t]he decision to serve in America’s military is not made
in a patriotic vacuum,” potential recruits will inevitably weigh the benefits of
service against the potentially fatal risks inherent in military service and the
difficulties of maintaining a civilian career.198 Socioeconomic status is one of
the most significant predictors of military service: unsurprisingly, people
189 . See Role of the Reserves in the Total Force Policy, supra note 27, at 136.
190. LAWRENCEKAPP& BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RESERVE
COMPONENT PERSONNEL ISSUES 8 (2017).
191. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR READINESS AND
FORCE MGMT., DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 2 tbl.1-1
(2017).
192. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, over fifty thousand National Guard soldiers
were deployed to support states’ recovery and relief operations. See James Stuhltrager, Send in
the Guard: The National Guard Response to Natural Disasters, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T.,
Spring 2006, at 21, 25.
193 . Id . at 21.
194 . E .g ., David Vergun, Army Sees Challenges Ahead to Recruiting Future Soldiers, U.S.
ARMY (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.army.mil/article/154299/Army_sees_challenges_ahead_
to_recruiting_future_Soldiers [https://perma.cc/CES9-A8ZH].
195. Richard J. Dunn, III, America’s Reserve and National Guard Components: Key Con-
tributors to U .S . Military Strength, in 2016 INDEXU.S. MIL. STRENGTH 61, 61 (Dakota L. Wood
ed., 2016), https://s3.amazonaws.om/ims-
2016/PDF/2016_index_of_US_Military_Strength_ESSAYS_DUNN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YG3U-QBDS].
196 . See Joe Gould, Mattis: Trump Military Buildup Begins in 2019, DEFENSENEWS (June
12, 2017), https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2017/06/13/mattis-trump-military-buildup-
begins-in-2019/ [https://perma.cc/GX7S-FQLF].
197 . See Bugbee, supra note 26, at 282–83. This problem is further compounded by the
risk that reservists can have “their contractually agreed-to terms of service extended under the
president’s ‘stop-loss’ authority.” Howard S. Suskin & Benjamin J. Wimmer, Arbitrability of
USERRA Claims: Battle on the Home Front, LAW.COM (Oct. 15, 2008, 12:00 AM),
https://www.law.com/almID/1202425266219 (on file with theMichigan Law Review).
198. Suskin &Wimmer, supra note 197.
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with lower family income are more likely to serve than people with higher
family income.199 Undermining the protections of USERRA by allowing em-
ployers to force claims into highly favorable arbitration proceedings exacer-
bates the already tenuous economic situation of military reservists. This will
likely have a negative impact on recruitment. Unfortunately, sheer patriot-
ism and a fervent desire to serve cannot overcome economic realities.
Retention may be similarly affected. Every military branch is already
struggling with retaining qualified reservists.200 USERRA’s inadequate pro-
tections may serve as the breaking point for reservists,201 who are faced more
frequently with the possibility of deployment202 while enticing civilian em-
ployment opportunities are also available.203 Although the military has tried
to boost its low retention numbers with bonuses,204 these measures may not
be very effective and may be excessively expensive.205 For example, the
House of Representatives recently passed the annual National Defense Au-
thorization Act, authorizing $700 billion in defense spending206 to help im-
199. Amy Lutz, Who Joins the Military? A Look at Race, Class, and Immigration Status,
36 J. POL. & MIL. SOC. 167, 184 (2008); see also Hungry Heroes: 25 Percent of Military Families
Seek Food Aid, NBC NEWS (Aug. 17, 2014, 7:43 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-
plain-sight/hungry-heroes-25-percent-military-families-seek-food-aid-n180236 [https://
perma.cc/2SP3-7S98].
200 . See, e .g ., Chief of Naval Pers. Pub. Affairs, CNP Issues Call to Action to Increase Navy
Retention, NAVY NEWS SERV. (Apr. 18, 2018, 12:55 PM), http://www.navy.mil/submit/
display.asp?story_id=105200 [https://perma.cc/75CJ-PGCR] (Navy retention); Tim Kane, How
to Lose Great Leaders? Ask the Army, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2013), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-leadership/how-to-lose-great-leaders-ask-the-army/
2013/02/05/725f177e-6fae-11e2-ac36-3d8d9dcaa2e2_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=
.5e042c347a6b [https://perma.cc/U4K9-C4G4] (Army retention); David Thornton, Air Force
Needs More Manpower to Improve Readiness, FED. NEWS RADIO (Mar. 23, 2017, 1:14 PM),
https://federalnewsradio.com/air-force/2017/03/air-force-needs-manpower-improve-readiness/
[https://perma.cc/V6Q3-Q323] (Air Force retention).
201 . See Kelley, supra note 75, at 406.
202 . See Jared Serbu, Army Wants More Guard, Reserve Deployments in 2017, FED. NEWS
RADIO (Feb. 29, 2016, 5:55 AM), https://federalnewsradio.com/army/2016/02/army-wants-
guard-reserve-deployments-2017/ [https://perma.cc/AJ8A-663X].
203. VAINE CALDWELL, WHY ARE FIRST TERM SOLDIERS LEAVING THE US ARMY
RESERVE? 16 (2010).
204 . See, e .g ., Hope Hodge Seck, Marines to Offer Retention Bonuses for F-35, V-22, F-18
Pilots, MILITARY.COM (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/03/29/
marines-to-offer-retention-bonuses-for-f35-v22-f18-pilots.html [https://perma.cc/5378-AU9R]
(reporting that the Marine Corps is offering retention bonuses for aviators “to compete with
the high-paying airline industry”).
205 . See Justin Joffrion & Nathan Wozny, Military Retention Incentives: Evidence from
the Air Force Selective Reenlistment Bonus 20 (Upjohn Inst., Working Paper No. 15-226, 2015),
http://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1243&context=up_workingpapers (on
file with theMichigan Law Review).
206. Patricia Zengerle, House Backs $700 Billion Defense Policy Bill, Funding Uncertain,
REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2017, 6:22 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-defense-congress/
house-backs-700-billion-defense-policy-bill-funding-uncertain-idUSKBN1DE351
[https://perma.cc/BQL9-LT5P].
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prove military readiness and low retention rates.207 But such extravagant
funding is antithetical to one of USERRA’s purposes: lowering the federal
government’s military costs by “taxing” employers.208
B. Counterarguments, Giving Servicemembers the Choice to Arbitrate,
and Using a Stop-Gap to Combat Compelled Arbitration
In his concurrence in Ziober, Judge Watford questioned whether the
court was reaching the correct result.209 He implied that he agreed with the
majority partly because he did not want to create a circuit split, “particularly
given the ease with which Congress can fix this problem.”210 However, Judge
Watford is considerably overestimating Congress’s ability, particularly in our
current political climate, to pass even the most benign bills that theoretically
should enjoy bipartisan support—such as providing servicemembers prom-
ised protections of reemployment.211
In 2008, Senator Robert Casey introduced the Servicemembers Access to
Justice Act (2008 SAJA).212 The 2008 SAJA was intended to overturn Garrett
by amending USERRA to provide that any employment agreement requiring
arbitration would be unenforceable.213 SAJA would have also provided addi-
tional protections to servicemembers by allowing: (1) USERRA plaintiffs to
bring claims against some state government employers in either federal or
state court; (2) additional remedies for successful USERRA plaintiffs, such as
punitive and liquidated damages; (3) mandatory attorney fees for successful
USERRA plaintiffs; and (4) a more streamlined injunctive relief process to
prevent terminations and expedite reemployment of returning servicemem-
bers.214 Despite then-Senator Barack Obama’s heartfelt argument that “[o]ur
returning service members and veterans should not have to fight another
207 . See Brennan Weiss, The New Proposed Defense Budget is Trying to Fix One of the
Military’s Biggest Problems, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017, 2:10 PM), http://www.business
insider.com/military-to-add-thousands-troops-increase-pay-for-soldiers-2017-11
[https://perma.cc/AMN5-MDZ5].
208 . See Suskin & Wimmer, supra note 197 (positing that by imposing reemployment
duties on employers, the federal government in effect “taxes” employers, so that the govern-
ment can afford a large military reserve while simultaneously encouraging military service).
209. Ziober v. BLB Res., Inc., 839 F.3d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 2016) (Watford, J., concurring).
210 . Id . at 822.
211. Elahe Izadi & Clare Foran, Why Congress Sometimes Can’t Even Pass Moderate, Bi-
partisan Bills, ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/
09/why-congress-sometimes-cant-even-pass-moderate-bipartisan-bills/444849/
[https://perma.cc/L3Y9-7DCK] (describing Congress’s inability to pass even the most
“[m]oderate, [b]ipartisan [b]ills” due to the legislative process and lack of productivity).
212. S. 3432, 110th Cong. §§ 1–9 (2008). In 2012, the SAJA was reintroduced. See S. 3236,
112th Cong. (2012).
213. S. 3432 § 3(a).
214 . Id . §§ 2–5, 9.
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battle at home for the benefits and rights they deserve,”215 SAJA died in Con-
gress’s Committee on Veterans Affairs.216
SAJA was briefly resurrected in 2012 (2012 SAJA), but it again stalled in
the Committee on Veterans Affairs.217 Although Congress’s inability to pass
SAJA could reflect its agreement with current circuit precedent, the more
likely cause is Congress’s extreme partisanship.218 In an era where words like
“hyper-partisan” and “unproductive” are the most common descriptors for
Congress,219 it is not surprising that Congress was unable to reach agreement
on this issue.220 Ardent advocates of arbitration and even moderates in Con-
gress most likely opposed SAJA due to the sheer strength of protections it
would suddenly provide servicemembers at employers’ expense. And be-
cause the 2012 SAJA was extremely similar to the 2008 SAJA, it is not sur-
prising that it was dead on arrival.221
One possible solution would be to pass a less expansive version of SAJA,
solely addressing the mandatory arbitration issue. One such attempt can be
seen in Senator Richard Blumenthal’s introduction of the Justice for Ser-
vicemembers Act of 2017 (JSA).222 Like SAJA, this bill would amend
USERRA to explicitly prohibit arbitration unless the servicemember freely
agrees to arbitration after the dispute arises.223 The bill would preserve the
servicemembers’ choice in deciding whether to arbitrate their USERRA
claims,224 and it would equalize the bargaining power of current and pro-
215 . Casey, Kennedy, Obama Introduce Bill to Help Servicemembers and Veterans Keep
Their Jobs, BOB CASEY (Aug. 1, 2008), https://www.casey.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/casey-
kennedy-obama-introduce-bill-to-help-servicemembers-and-veterans-keep-their-jobs
[https://perma.cc/6YTW-CGTZ] (statement of Senator Obama).
216 . See S. 3424.
217 . See S. 3236.
218 . See Noel Rubinton, In a Polarized Era, Efforts to Boost Bipartisanship in Congress,
WILLIAM & FLORA HEWLETT FOUND. (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.hewlett.org/making-
bipartisanship-stick-in-congress/ [https://perma.cc/EM92-7PPJ].
219 . Id .
220. This partisanship is exacerbated by the presence of pro-arbitration Republicans who
are “categorically opposed to any efforts that could possibly chip away at the nation’s ardent
pro-arbitration position.” Kelley, supra note 75, at 409; see John G. Jacobs, Letter to the Editor,
Why Arbitration Is a Rigged System, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/20/opinion/why-arbitration-is-a-rigged-system.html (on file with the Michigan Law
Review).
221 . See Kelley, supra note 75, at 409 (describing the 2012 SAJA as “essentially [a] carbon
cop[y]” of the 2008 SAJA).
222 . See S. 646, 115th Cong. (2017). The bill currently has five cosponsors; the latest co-
sponsor, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, signed on October 31, 2017. Id .; Cosponsors: S .646 —
115th Congress (2017-2018), CONGRESS.GOV (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/senate-bill/646/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/AY7V-QYUL].
223. S. 646 § 108.
224. Since USERRA has a “savings” clause (§ 4302(b)), an employer would not be able to
choose trial if there was an arbitration agreement.
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spective employees.225 Further, placing the choice of whether to arbitrate in
the hands of servicemembers more closely aligns with Congress’s intent.
Congress did not intend for servicemembers to be bound by coercive arbi-
tration agreements; on the contrary, “Congress intended employees, not em-
ployers, to dictate the method or forum in which they pursue their rights
under USERRA.”226 While SAJA is a superior bill, it likely stands little chance
of passing the contemporary Congress. The JSA, albeit less protective, would
go a long way toward restoring USERRA’s substantive protections, and it
should be passed by Congress for our servicemembers’ sake.
Proponents of mandatory arbitration might protest that this would lead
to an influx of claims, further burdening our judiciary.227 But the specter of
increased claims clogging the judiciary pales in comparison to the risk posed
to our servicemembers and, ultimately, our national defense if we are unable
to retain qualified reservists. Moreover, if arbitration actually is mutually fa-
vorable, servicemembers may elect to arbitrate to take advantage of its bene-
fits. For example, there is currently no guarantee that a servicemember will
be awarded attorney fees under USERRA even if they prevail.228 If the ser-
vicemember elects arbitration, however, the employer will bear the costs.229
Even if the majority of servicemembers forego arbitration in favor of trial, an
increase in claims is unlikely to have a noticeable impact on the judiciary be-
cause of the limited number of servicemembers. Additionally, any nonmeri-
torious claims can easily be dismissed by courts, whereas leaving service-
members with no path to recovery would result in a greater monetary value
of inefficiency. More importantly, a huge spike in USERRA claims would
alert legislators and the public that employment discrimination against ser-
vicemembers is a widespread problem.
There might also be concerns about the unexpected side effects of allow-
ing servicemembers to opt out of arbitration. Employers may decide not to
hire any servicemembers at all to avoid the risk of losing a reservist employee
to deployment. Or, employers may perceive an increased risk of liability
without the protections of mandatory arbitration and price that risk into
their business model, lowering wages as a result. But these potential conse-
quences can be mitigated by stringently enforcing USERRA. Not hiring ser-
225 . See Feingold, supra note 44, at 292 (“With the threat of not getting a job or a promo-
tion, these [arbitration] agreements effectively, by withholding work, coerce individuals into
relinquishing fundamental legal protections.”).
226. Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 564 (6th Cir. 2008) (Cole, J., con-
curring).
227. There is also no definitive evidence that the number of USERRA claims brought to
in federal court would noticeably increase. See Liptak, supra note 23.
228. 38 U.S.C. § 4323(h)(2) (2012) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision
of this chapter by a person . . . who obtained private counsel for such action or proceeding, the
court may award any such person who prevails . . . reasonable attorney fees . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
229 . Id . § 4323(h)(1) (“No fees or court costs may be charged or taxed against any person
claiming rights under [USERRA].”).
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vicemembers or paying them lower wages because of their military service is
exactly the type of discrimination that USERRA forbids. Admittedly, this
puts the onus on employers to bear the costs of hiring and employing ser-
vicemembers,230 but employers are likely better situated to minimize and
spread these costs than individual servicemembers are.
In lieu of legislation or a Supreme Court ruling, diverting funds to the
Attorney General’s office can act as a stopgap. In EEOC v . Waffle House, Inc .,
the Supreme Court held that the EEOC may still sue an employer in court on
its own, even if there is an arbitration agreement, because the EEOC has “in-
dependent statutory authority” to “vindicate the public interest.”231 Similarly,
the Attorney General’s office may be able to bring a USERRA claim against
an employer, even in the face of an arbitration agreement.232 Despite review-
ing 930 new cases in fiscal year 2016, however, the Department of Labor only
referred sixty-one cases to the Attorney General, and the Attorney General
filed only four USERRA complaints in federal court.233 If the Attorney Gen-
eral is bringing so few claims because of a lack of funds,234 diverting some
money from the Department of Defense’s retention budget to the Attorney
General’s office may help increase the number of USERRA claims the Attor-
ney General can bring. For example, expanding the Attorney General’s staff
would allow the office to investigate more referrals and file more lawsuits.
And since the Attorney General has a policy of resolving referrals expedi-
tiously through settlements whenever possible, even a slight increase in the
number of available staff would yield tangible benefits to a greater number of
servicemembers.235
230 . See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF RESERVE CALL-UPS ON CIVILIAN
EMPLOYERS 17–20 (2005), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/63xx/doc
6351/05-11-reserves.pdf [https://perma.cc/N95S-D2ZU].
231. 534 U.S. 279, 290 (2002) (quoting EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 809
(4th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 534 U.S. 279 (2002)).
232. The Fifth Circuit discussed the possibility of having the Attorney General pursue a
claim for a servicemember in rejecting Garrett’s argument that mandatory arbitration conflict-
ed with USERRA. See Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 681 (5th Cir. 2006); see
also supra notes 88–89.
233. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FY 2016 USERRA ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 8 (2017),
https://www.dol.gov/vets/programs/userra/USERRA_Annual_FY2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8ZWM-KAWA].
234 . See Josh Gerstein, Trump Justice Budget Targets Illegal Immigration, POLITICO (May
23, 2017, 6:40 PM), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2017/05/23/trump-
justice-department-immigration-238738 [https://perma.cc/Q8N8-YLKJ] (“The Trump admin-
istration is proposing a $27.7 billion [sic] for the Justice Department in fiscal 2018, down $1.1
billion . . . from the . . . previous year.”).
235. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 233, at 6–7. Additionally, just having the weight of
the Attorney General behind a servicemember would probably create an incentive for the em-
ployer to settle as soon as possible.
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CONCLUSION
Deployments are difficult for any servicemember, regardless of whether
the servicemember is on active duty or a reservist.236 Reservists, however,
face an additional difficulty. Not only do reservists worry about their family
left behind, their responsibilities to the soldiers in their care, and their own
safety, they also worry about whether they will have a job if they return. As
Kevin Ziober put it, “[n]o service member who is asked to serve their coun-
try should have to worry about fighting for their job when they return home
from war.”237 Despite Congress’s recognition of servicemembers’ vulnerabili-
ties, USERRA cannot provide adequate protections if the judiciary continues
to subvert congressional intent.238 The government needs to defend our ser-
vicemembers at home so that our servicemembers can focus on defending
our nation. Prohibiting mandatory arbitration agreements, whether by Con-
gress explicitly amending USERRA or by the judiciary interpreting USERRA
as intended, would be a significant step toward showing our servicemembers
that we too are willing to fight.
236. Marcy L. Karin & Katie Onachila, The Military’s Workplace Flexibility Framework, 3
AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 153, 188–89 (2013).
237. Megan Leonhardt, Democrats Are Trying to Make It Easier for People to Take Their
Employers to Court, TIME (Mar. 7, 2017) (statement of Kevin Ziober), http://time.com/money/
4694256/democrats-employers-court-mandatory-arbitration/?xid=homepage
[https://perma.cc/NEC4-GKN3].
238 . See Milhauser v. Minco Prods. Inc., 701 F. 3d 268, 272–73 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding
that deployed servicemembers returning home are not necessarily entitled to reemployment
under USERRA because if the servicemember would have been terminated even if he had nev-
er deployed, the layoff was completely justified and legal); Shaun So, Can You Believe This Is
Legal? Military Guard and Reserve Employees Can Be Laid Off During Deployments, FORBES
(Apr. 4, 2013, 11:20 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/shaunso/2013/04/04/can-you-believe-
this-is-legal-military-guard-and-reserve-employees-can-be-laid-off-during-deployments/
#4d9ab3452beb (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (explaining how the Eighth Circuit’s
holding creates a loophole that employers can use to wrongly fire servicemembers).
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